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ANTICIPATING PATENTABLE SUBJECT
MATTER
Dan L. Burk*
The Supreme Court has added to its upcoming docket Association for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., to consider the question: “Are
human genes patentable?”1 This question implicates patent law’s “products of
nature” doctrine, which excludes from patentability naturally occurring
materials. The Supreme Court has previously recognized that “anything under
the sun that is made by man” falls within patentable subject matter,2 implying
that things under the sun not made by man do not fall within patentable subject
matter. Indeed, the Court has written that items such as “a new mineral
discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild” would constitute
unpatentable products of nature.3
One of the recurring arguments for classifying genes as products of nature
has been that these materials, even if created in the laboratory, could sometimes
instead have been located by scouring the contents of human cells. But virtually
the same argument has been advanced and rejected in another area of patent
law: the novelty of patented inventions. The rule in that context has been that
we reward the inventor who provides us with access to the materials, even if in
hindsight they might have already been present in the prior art. As a matter of
doctrine and policy, the rule for patentable subject matter should be the same.
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1. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012)

(granting certiorari); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 694 (No.
11-725), 2011 WL 6257250. The Court will hear oral argument in the case on April 15,
2013.
2. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979,
at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
3. Id.
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NATURAL AND UNNATURAL DNA
The patents at issue in Myriad claim DNA sequences that are useful in
testing for genes that predispose their carriers to certain forms of breast cancer.
Among the DNA molecules challenged in the case are “copy DNA,” or
cDNAs, of the cancer genes. Such cDNAs are produced in the laboratory by a
process called reverse transcription. Reverse transcription uses viral enzymes to
produce a DNA copy of RNA transcripts gleaned from human cells.4 This
process is called reverse transcription because cellular transcription processes
normally transcribe RNA from DNA, not the other way around. The cDNAs
differ from the native chromosomal DNA sequences because, having been
reverse transcribed from RNA transcripts, the cDNAs lack intervening DNA
sequences or “introns” that are found in the native chromosomal genes but are
edited out of the RNAs produced from chromosomal DNA.
Because the cDNAs differ structurally from native or genomic DNA,
Myriad (the patent holder) argued that they must be human inventions, not
products of nature. This argument was unanimously accepted by an otherwise
divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, not once, but
twice, after a first appeal from the trial court and again on remand from the
Supreme Court.5 But opponents of DNA patenting—including scientific
research societies—have argued that such cDNAs constitute unpatentable
products of nature because it may sometimes be possible to locate them in
human cells, not just in the laboratory as the result of human manipulation.
Their reasoning is that RNA viruses are found in human cells, which means
that the reverse transcriptase enzyme is sometimes active in human cells, and
so could sometimes produces cDNA transcripts of human DNA. Because there
are billions of human cells in existence, reverse transcription of the Myriad
cancer genes somewhere at some time is almost a statistical certainty.
INHERENT ANTICIPATION
The opponents’ argument fundamentally misunderstands and misrepresents
the products of nature doctrine. The view they endorse—that because a
structure identical or similar to the claimed invention might sometimes be
found to occur without human manipulation, the claimed invention fails
4. JAMES WATSON ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 749 (6th ed.
2008). Human cells typically use DNA as a template to synthesize messenger RNA (mRNA)
molecules. These mRNAs are then used as templates for protein synthesis. Id. at 32-35.
5. Although unanimous on the patentability of cDNA, the panel split over the
patentability of other types of DNA molecules. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom.
Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 694; Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1349-53 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded sub nom. Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
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patentability—effectively imports into patent law’s subject matter provisions
the doctrine of inherency, in its worst possible formulation. Inherency has
generally been associated with the novelty provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 102 in the
patent statute.6 This statutory section requires that a patentable invention must
not be anticipated in the prior art; that is, not previously known or used in the
relevant technological field. In the novelty context, inherency addresses the
situation where the claimed invention (typically a chemical compound) can in
hindsight be recognized to have occurred in some milieu prior to the date of
invention. The question is whether the claimed invention can be said to be
novel if it existed, albeit unnoticed, prior to the date of invention.
The answer to the inherency question is that making the invention readily
available is more important to the patent system than is the invention’s prior
unappreciated existence. Two famous cases are illustrative. Tilghman v.
Proctor concerned a method patent for production of fatty acids by breaking
down animal fat under heat and pressure.7 The patent was challenged for lack
of novelty, on the theory that a previously known steam engine, which was
lubricated with animal fat, necessarily (although fortuitously) would have
identically produced fatty acids by heat and pressure in the course of its
operation. Similarly, patent claims to transuranic elements, produced in a
nuclear reactor, were challenged for lack of novelty in In re Seaborg.8 The
Patent Office had rejected Glenn Seaborg’s patent application, arguing that the
elements claimed in the patent were likely to have also previously occurred in
small, unrecognized quantities in nuclear reactors of the type described in a
patent disclosure by Enrico Fermi—the design and operation of the reactors
made production of the claimed elements physically inevitable.
In each case the novelty challenge to the claimed inventions was rejected,
even though the claimed inventions were inherent in prior technology. The
courts in these cases held that hindsight realization of the inventions’ presence
in earlier technologies, recognized only afterward and due to the disclosure of
later inventors, did not anticipate the later claims. Fatty acids may have been
produced in the prior art steam engine of Tilghman v. Proctor, but no one knew
or appreciated their presence. Seaborg’s transuranic elements may have been
produced in the Fermi nuclear pile, but in quantities that were undetectable had
anyone known to look for them. The fact that the inventions may previously
have been inherently present, unrecognized or unavailable, in the prior art was
of no benefit to humankind.9 The disclosure in the subsequent invention made
the benefit available, and so garnered the patent reward.
6. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV . 371, 375

(2005).
7. 102 U.S. 707, 708-09, 711-12 (1880).
8. 328 F.2d 996, 996 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
9. See Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 710-14, 718 (1880); Application of Glenn

T. Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996, 998-99 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
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Although there has been occasional judicial confusion regarding this
principle of inherency, the clear trend in cases—including the most recent
Federal Circuit decisions—has adhered to this analysis.10 The question is not
whether the claimed invention may fortuitously have occurred in some previous
situation, it is whether the public already had the benefit of the invention
disclosed by the claimant. Mark Lemley and I have previously shown that this
justification should apply not only to anticipation, but also to the products-ofnature discussion.11 And so one might ask in the subject matter context, as in
the inherent novelty context: did the public have the benefit of the invention as
a “natural” constituent of the world, or was it made available for human use by
the patentee?
This is the only formulation of the products of nature inquiry that makes
any sense as a matter of policy. The exclusive rights of a patent grant are
intended largely as a reward for investing the time and effort to bring to the
fund of human knowledge some useful technology not previously available.12
We do not give patents for technology already available. This is the gist of the
inherency inquiry under § 102: if the public already had the benefit of the
invention, there is no need to offer a patent. If we are going to ask about
inherency in the context of subject matter, the inquiry should be exactly the
same with regard to products of nature: Did the public have the benefit of the
claimed invention in some native, natural form? Or was the invention made
available to humankind by means of the inventor’s ingenuity?
NATURE AS PRIOR ART
Section 101 of the patent statute says nothing about inherency or about
comparing an invention to prior art. The impulse to apply an inherency analysis
to products of nature may in part be attributable to a misguided suggestion in
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Parker v. Flook that products of nature are
somehow assumed to constitute “prior art” for the § 101 patentability
analysis.13 This approach probably misreads the Flook opinion, but even if
correct, the Court disavowed it in subsequent decisions. After the Flook
decision, the Supreme Court remanded a patentability case, Parker v. Bergy, to
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals for “further consideration in light of
Parker v. Flook.”14 In the lower court’s rather dyspeptic reconsideration of
Bergy—which concluded that the Flook opinion shed no light whatsoever on
the question of patentable subject matter or the proper resolution of Bergy’s
10. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir.

2003).

11. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 6, at 403-07.
12. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
13. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1978).
14. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978).
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claims—Judge Giles Rich very pointedly criticized the Flook opinion for
conflating the analysis of patentable subject matter with that of other
patentability criteria, such as novelty and nonobviousness.15 Judge Rich took
particular exception to the concept of prior art in the context of patentable
subject matter, as comparison to prior art was relevant only to the separate and
distinct steps of determining novelty and nonobviousness.
Subsequently, a new majority of the Supreme Court appears to have taken
Judge Rich’s critique to heart, citing Bergy II with approval in the later
Diamond v. Diehr opinion. Diehr was clearly taken as an opportunity to correct
Flook’s indiscretions, although the majority stopped short of overruling it.
Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion did repudiate the Flook “prior art” dicta:
“[i]t is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to
ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis.”16 The majority then
went on (in a footnote) to explicitly reject the reading of Flook that categorized
known or natural elements of the invention as “prior art,” noting that “[t]o
accept the analysis [from Flook] proffered by the petitioner would, if carried to
its extreme, make all inventions unpatentable because all inventions can be
reduced to underlying principles of nature which, once known, make their
implementation obvious.”17
Although Flook has been cited in recent Supreme Court opinions, it has not
been cited for its now-discredited “prior art” analysis, nor should it be.18 If
adopted as the law in Myriad, such an approach would, for example, quickly
eviscerate chemical patent practice, particularly in small molecule organic
chemistry. Time plus carbon plus heat yields organic molecules, in nearly
infinite variety. That is the nature of carbon: it tends to form branching chains
of various lengths. We can probably safely assume that any organic molecule
imaginable exists or has existed somewhere in the universe at some time in
“nature,” if only we could hunt long enough or far enough to find it. On this
theory, no molecule would ever be patentable. Statistically, they all exist
somewhere—in the hydrocarbon fountains of Jovian moons, or the tails of
comets, or sulfur vents in the Mariana trench—just as Seaborg’s transuranic
elements certainly must be found somewhere in nature—say, the outer shells of
aged stars.
Despite the putative existence of the Myriad genes or other patented
substances in some obscure corner of nature, we want to reward inventors who

15. In re Bergy (Bergy II), 596 F.2d 952, 962 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated sub nom.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
16. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188, 190 (1981).
17. Id. at 189 n.12.
18. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010) (“Flook stands for the
proposition that the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment’ or
adding ‘insignificant postsolution activity.’” (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-92)).
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provide access to molecules that were previously giving us no benefit. The hunt
for inherent products of nature seems particularly ill conceived as an incentive
for innovation. It depends upon inventors’ own disclosure, commencing once
an inventor has delivered the molecule and we know what we are hunting for.
Certainly in the context of patent law’s nonobviousness doctrine we do not
permit such hindsight second-guessing of the inventor. The invention is to be
considered as a whole as it would have been viewed at the time it was
created—not dissected into its constituent components and viewed with the
benefit of seeing the assembled device.19 This policy seems to be the gist of the
§ 102 inherency cases as well; it may be that with the inventor’s contribution in
hand, we can conduct a belated search for it amid the prior art, but if no one
benefitted from or appreciated the invention until the inventor’s disclosure, the
invention remains novel for purposes of the statute. And, Justice Rehnquist’s
footnote in Diamond v. Diehr properly rejects hindsight reconstruction for
purposes of § 101: all inventions can be reduced to obvious natural elements
after the fact of their creation, but doing so is not a productive inquiry for
determining patentable subject matter.
CONCLUSION
“I can find the invention somewhere in nature once an inventor has shown
it to me” is clearly the wrong standard for a patent system that hopes to
promote progress in the useful arts.20 The fact that a version of the invention
may have previously existed, unrecognized, unavailable, and unappreciated,
should be irrelevant to patentability under either novelty or subject matter. The
proper question is: did the inventor make available to humankind something we
didn’t have available before? On this standard, the reverse transcribed
molecules created by the inventors in Myriad are clearly patentable subject
matter.

19. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2011).
20. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

